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Delayed policy responses to COVID-19: The role of the WHO’s structural 
problem  
By Mira Fischer 
The policy responses to the outbreak of COVID-19 clearly demonstrate the need to 
improve international coordination within the public health sector. The World Health 
Organization (WHO), whose duties include both the securing of facts and the formulation 
of political recommendations, plays a key role here. However, events in recent months 
show that the interlacing of both tasks within one organization is problematic. 
Since the outbreak was announced officially at the end of January, the WHO has 
consistently advised against travel restrictions. It continues to do so, despite its situation 
report of February 28, 2020 stating that those countries that did implement travel 
restrictions contrary to its own recommendations were, if unable to prevent the 
importation of the virus entirely, at least able to slow its spread. However, back in 
January, the WHO had praised China's approach of drastically restricting travel 
opportunities at home. 
It may seem baffling at first: Why would the WHO recognize the effectiveness of travel 
restrictions in delaying the spread of the virus, yet nonetheless issue advice against 
them? It is all the more astonishing as several Asian countries, responding swiftly with a 
combination of travel restrictions, large-scale contact tracing and social distancing, seem 
to have brought the outbreak under control weeks ago, using hardly any restrictions on 
movement, and incurring relatively little damage economically. It suggests that a 
pandemic, and especially COVID-19’s spread from richer to poorer countries, could have 
been prevented - if earlier action had been taken. Even if one does not believe in the 
downright success of these measures, wouldn’t they at least have significantly shortened 
the time period between health care systems becoming overburdened and the widespread 
availability of an antidote, on balance saving social costs? 
According to experts, when the new coronavirus first became known, the WHO was in a 
quandary. It was the first time it had been confronted with such a rapidly spreading 
epidemic within a country so powerful and, in many ways, closed. Since the WHO needed 
information from China to be able to assess the situation, it had to take Chinese economic 
interests into account when communicating its assessment. The WHO's recommendation 
not to restrict air traffic from China may have been a part of this compromise. For the 
latter, the WHO and its Director-General Tedros Ghebreyesus faced heavy criticism on 
social media this January, the thrust of which will not have escaped the ears of European 
governments. Nevertheless, the German government followed suit by rejecting all 
restrictions on travel until mid-March. 
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By the time the horrors of exponential spread became apparent even to laymen however, 
the German government was quick to curtail the liberty of every single person in the 
country. While on March 8, the only thing being discussed was the cancellation of major 
events, Germany went into lockdown just a week later, which banned all cultural and 
social life in one stroke, effectively cost millions of people their jobs and prevented 
children from going to school. Most European countries also imposed drastic restrictions, 
and by March 17, the European Union had closed its borders - at a time when this would 
hardly have had any notable positive effect. Germany, for example, already had over 9,000 
confirmed cases by that time, and the virus had already started to spread from Europe to 
other continents. 
Countries like Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, which introduced travel restrictions 
against the WHO's recommendation yet simultaneously followed its recommendation to 
immediately start testing citizens for the new coronavirus, only suffered a very small 
number of infections and fatalities. Compared to most European countries, this was 
achieved with fewer restrictions on both individual freedoms and economic life. 
European countries, on the other hand, did the exact opposite, initially following the 
WHO’s advice that was cheap (no travel restrictions) yet not implementing the advice that 
was costly in the short term (mass testing). This only seems to have made the lockdown 
necessary as a kind of sledgehammer approach to suppress new infections. 
It remains unclear whether the WHO made a mistake, or acted in a welfare-maximizing 
manner under the constraints it was given, when trading restraint in travel 
recommendations for Chinese information about the outbreak. If, however, governments 
followed the WHO’s travel recommendations while failing to notice that strategic 
dependencies meant that they rather had to be too cautious, this was not welfare-
maximizing, neither from a national, nor from a global perspective. As long as the task of 
securing facts is not separated from the role of norm setter, the global community will 
likely not be able to contain future epidemics any better. Only disentangling scientific 
and political functions by way of institutional reform will lead to substantial 
improvements. Attempting blanket punishment by cutting the WHO’s funding, as, for 
example, threatened by Donald Trump, will not. 
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